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LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND THE PUBLIC
DUTY DOCTRINE AFTER WOOD V. GUILFORD
COUNTY
ANITA R. BROWN-GRAHAM
This Article reviews the evolution of the public duty doctrine in
North Carolina tort law, culminating with its application in Wood
v. Guilford County. It addresses the anomalies, inconsistencies,
and ironies surrounding the doctrine, many of which were ignored
by the Wood decision, and 4luestions the doctrine's continued
viability in North Carolina. After analyzing the legal and policy
arguments in favor of and against retaining the doctrine, the
author concludes that the state courts should continue to provide
the defense to local governments.
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Fictional features and fairy-tale distinctions are common in the
law of local government liability. Yet even among the unwieldy rules
of public liability, the North Carolina courts' application of the public
duty doctrine stands out as problematic. Commonly referred to as
"the duty to all, duty to none" rule,' this judicially crafted doctrine
declares that a local government is under no duty to protect any
specific individual from the wrongful acts of a third person absent a
"special duty" of protection or a "special relationship" between the
claimant and local government.2 While fairly straightforward in
theory, the public duty doctrine's fifteen-year history in North
Carolina's courts has been full of twists and turns.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina authored its latest, though
surely not last, chapter in the doctrine's evolution when it decided
Wood v. Guilford County3 in 2002. Shelley Austin Wood was
criminally assaulted in a restroom at the Guilford County Courthouse
in High Point, North Carolina, her place of employment.' After the
assault, she filed a complaint against her employer Guilford County
(the "County") and Burns International Security ("Burns"), the
private firm under contract with the County to provide security for
1. See Clouse v. Arizona, 16 P.3d 757, 767 (Ariz. 2001); Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152,
159 (Colo. 1986); accord Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 241 (Alaska 1976) (referring to
"the duty to all, duty to none"); Hunt v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 348 N.C. 192, 203, 499
S.E.2d 747, 753 (1998) (Orr, J., dissenting) ("A duty to all is a duty to none.").
2. See Braswell v. Braswell, 330 N.C. 363, 371, 410 S.E.2d 897, 901--02 (1991) (citing
Coleman v. Cooper, 89 N.C. App. 188, 194, 366 S.E.2d 2,6 (1988)).
While this policy is a necessary and reasonable limit on liability, exceptions exist
to prevent inevitable inequities to certain individuals. There are two generally
recognized exceptions to the public duty doctrine: (1) where there is a special
relationship between the injured party and the police, for example, a state's
witness or informant who has aided law enforcement officers; and (2) "when a
municipality, through its police officers, creates a special duty by promising
protection to an individual, the protection is not forthcoming, and the
individual's reliance on the promise of protection is causally related to the injury
suffered."
Id.
3. 355 N.C. 161, 558 S.E.2d 490 (2002).
4. Id. at 162,558 S.E.2d at 492.
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the courthouse.' The complaint alleg6d that the County and Burns
were negligent in failing to adequately protect Ms. Wood from the
assault and attempted rape.6 Claiming fidelity to its prior decisions,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the public duty
doctrine applied to bar the action against the County.7 With little
evocative discussion, the court reasoned that the public duty doctrine
applies whenever general police functions are implicated without
facts to suggest a special duty or special relationship. 8 The court's
brief and formulaic opinion belied the difficulty of the underlying
issues; the court missed an opportunity to clarify and justify the public
duty doctrine, improve the predictability of public liability, and
explicitly balance the twin public policy concerns of private
compensation and governmental protection.
This Article considers the Wood decision and its implications for
North Carolina's local governments. Part I chronicles the evolution
of the public duty doctrine, with a particular focus on the Supreme
Court of North Carolina's six principal public duty doctrine decisions
preceding Wood.9 Part II briefly details the facts of Wood, the
decisions by the lower courts, and the opinion of the Supreme Court
of North Carolina. It points out some of the anomalies,
inconsistencies and ironies surrounding the doctrine, all of which
were ignored by the Wood decision. Part III analyzes the threshold
issue of whether judicial application of the public duty doctrine
contravenes legislative abrogation of governmental immunity and
surmises that it does not. Part IV argues that the doctrine, as
presently applied, may add little substantive protection beyond that
already afforded by governmental immunity or traditional negligence
law; nonetheless, it provides significant procedural benefits to local
governments. In the final analysis, the Article concludes that, despite
the confusion surrounding the doctrine, public policy considerations
weigh in favor of retaining the defense for North Carolina's local
governments.
5. Id. at 163, 558 S.E.2d at 492-93.
6. Id. at 163, 558 S.E.2d at 493. The plaintiff also claimed that, as an employee of the
courthouse, she was a third party beneficiary of the contract between the County and
Burns. Id.
7. Id. at 169-70, 558 S.E.2d at 496-97.
8. Id. at 170, 558 S.E.2d at 497.
9. Lovelace v. City of Shelby, 351 N.C. 458, 526 S.E.2d 652 (2000); Thompson v.
Waters, 351 N.C. 462, 526 S.E.2d 650 (2000); Isenhour v. Hutto, 350 N.C. 601, 517 S.E.2d
121 (1999); Hunt v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 348 N.C. 192, 499 S.E.2d 747 (1998); Stone v.
N.C. Dep't of Labor, 347 N.C. 473, 495 S.E.2d 711 (1998); Braswell v. Braswell, 330 N.C.
363,410 S.E.2d 897 (1991).
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC DUTY DOCrRINE IN NORTH
CAROLINA
A. The Doctrine's Humble Beginnings: Braswell
Cooley's treatise on the law of torts offers this frequently quoted
statement of the public duty doctrine:
In order that a public officer shall be liable to an individual in
tort, it is necessary that the officer shall have violated some
legal duty owing by him to such individual, as a result of which
violation the individual has suffered damage. For the mere
failure of an officer to perform a public duty owing by him to
the public at large, as for example, the duty of a legislator to act
honestly, or of an executive officer to enforce the law, no action
lies by an individual.'0
The doctrine evolved to protect governments and their
employees from liability for negligence in failing to protect a citizen
from the harmful conduct of a third party." A party seeking to
recover damages under the common law of negligence must establish
a legal duty, a breach of that duty, and an injury proximately caused
by the breach.' By holding that, as a matter of law, the government
has no legal duty to protect the individual citizen, the public duty
doctrine serves to negate one of the essential elements of a plaintiff's
case.
The United States Supreme Court first recognized the public
duty doctrine in 1855.13 However, the doctrine was unknown in North
Carolina law until 1988 when the court of appeals applied it for the
10. THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 60, at 144
(Revised student's ed. 1930).
11. See Braswell v. Braswell, 330 N.C. 363, 370-71, 410 S.E.2d 897, 901 (1991) ("For
the courts to proclaim a new and general duty of protection in the law of tort, even to
those who may be the particular seekers of protection based on specific hazards, could and
would inevitably determine how the limited police resources ... should be allocated and
without predictable limits"); ANITA R. BROWN-GRAHAM, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE
LIABILITY OF NORTH CAROLINA CITIES AND COUNTIES, 2-9 (University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill Institute of Government 1999) ("There are circumstances in which
a unit of local government has no legal duty to protect an individual citizen from harm
caused by a third person.").
12. See Kientz v. Carlton, 245 N.C. 236, 240, 96 S.E.2d 14,17 (1957).
13. See South v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396 (1855). In South, the plaintiff sued
the sheriff alleging that the sheriff negligently failed to protect him from a mob. Id. at 398.
The Court held that the sheriff's duty as conservator of the peace was "a public duty, for
neglect of which he is amenable to the public, and punishable by indictment only." Id. at
403.
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first time in Coleman v. Cooper14 to absolve a local government from
liability for failing to protect two young girls who were murdered by
their father."5 Three years later, in Braswell v. Braswell,6 the
Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed that the doctrine
protected local governments from tort liability "for the failure to
furnish police protection to specific individuals." 7
Braswell involved allegations that a sheriff negligently failed to
provide police protection for a woman who was fatally shot by her
estranged husband, a deputy sheriff. 8 The sheriff had assured Mrs.
Braswell that "he would see she got back and forth to work safely...
[and] that his men would be keeping an eye on her."' 9 Her well-being
was short-lived, however. Mr. Braswell killed his wife while she was
running an errand during her lunch period.20 The supreme court used
the public duty doctrine to shield the county from liability for the
sheriff's failure to protect her.2' According to the court:
The amount of protection that may be provided is limited by
the resources of the community and by a considered legislative-
14. 89 N.C. App. 188, 366 S.E.2d 2 (1988) (citing Warren v. District of Columbia, 444
A.2d 1 (D.C. 1981); Evett v. City of Inverness, 224 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969);
Keane v. City of Chicago, 240 N.E.2d 321 (I11. App. Ct. 1968); Food Fair v. City of
Evansville, 272 N.E.2d 871 (Ind. Ct. App. 1971); Evers v. Westerberg, 38 N.E.2d 751 (N.Y.
1972); Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 669 P.2d 451 (Wash. 1983)).
15. Coleman, 89 N.C. App. at 192-94, 366 S.E.2d at 5-6. The court of appeals
determined that the public duty doctrine applied to bar a wrongful death suit against the
police department, the city, the county, and Kathy Cooper, a county social worker, for the
death of two young girls at the hands of their father. Id. at 194-95, 366 S.E.2d at 7.
Cooper assured the girls' mother that the police would provide protection from the father
for the girls, if needed. Id. at 190, 366 S.E.2d at 4. The court held that the police
department owed no specific duty to protect the girls and the facts of the case did not
support a finding of either exception to the public duty doctrine: special relationship or
special duty. Id. at 194-95, 366 S.E.2d at 7. Although the police interviewed the two
young victims to substantiate a claim of sexual abuse against the father, the girls were
merely potential witnesses who would likely be called by the State at the time of trial. Id.
at 195, 366 S.E.2d at 7. The city's police department had no policy of providing police
protection to potential witnesses in a criminal case and the law did not require otherwise.
Id. Therefore, there was no special relationship between the police and the girls. The
evidence also failed to support a finding of a special duty. Id. at 194, 366 S.E.2d at 7. The
officer in charge of the case did not tell the mother or the girls that any kind of protection
would be afforded to them. Id. Although the social worker made some general
assurances and the officer was aware of prior acts of violence by the father, the girls said
they were not afraid of their father. Id. Thus, there appeared to be neither specific
assurances by the police nor detrimental reliance by the girls. Id.
16. 330 N.C. 363,410 S.E.2d 897 (1991).
17. Id. at 370, 410 S.E.2d at 901.
18. Id. at 369-70, 410 S.E.2d at 901.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 369, 410 S.E.2d at 901.
21. Id. at 372,410 S.E.2d at 902.
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executive decision as to how those resources may be deployed.
For the courts to proclaim a new and general duty of protection
in the law of tort, even to those who may be the particular
seekers of protection based on specific hazards, could and
would inevitably determine how the limited police resources...
should be allocated and [would do so] without predictable
limits. 22
Absent special circumstances constituting exceptions to the
public duty doctrine, the sheriff's department was under no duty to
protect Mrs. Braswell from her husband. 23 The court stated:
There are two generally recognized exceptions to the public
duty doctrine: (1) where there is a special relationship between
the injured party and the police, for example, a state's witness
or informant who has aided law enforcement officers; and (2)
"when a municipality, through its police officers, creates a
special duty by promising protection to an individual, the
protection is not forthcoming, and the individual's reliance on
the promise of protection is causally related to the injury
suffered."
24
The court found no facts to suggest a special relationship between
Mrs. Braswell and the sheriff's department and turned its attention,
therefore, to whether the sheriff's remarks created a special duty to
protect Mrs. Braswell.25 The court suggested the remarks made by
the sheriff to Mrs. Braswell "were general words of comfort and
assurance, commonly offered by law enforcement officers in
situations involving domestic problems, and that such promises were
merely gratuitous and hence not sufficient to constitute an actual
promise of safety. '26 Moreover, Mrs. Braswell was killed while on a
midday errand, not while traveling to and from work, "and hence was
outside the scope of protection arguably promised."27 Thus, there
was no special duty.
For nine years the public duty doctrine evolved exclusively and
22. Id. at 370-71, 410 S.E.2d at 901 (quoting Riss v. City of New York, 240 N.E.2d
860-61 (N.Y. 1968)).
23. Id. at 371,410 S.E.2d at 902 (citing Coleman v. Cooper, 89 N.C. App. 188, 194, 366
S.E.2d 2,6 (1988)).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 372, 410 S.E.2d at 901-02.
26. Id. at 371-72, 410 S.E.2d at 902. The court did acknowledge that the promise of
protection to Mrs. Braswell as she traveled to and from work arguably could have been
specific enough to create a special duty exception to the public duty doctrine. Id. at 372,
410 S.E.2d at 902.
27. Id.
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actively in the North Carolina Court of Appeals. By 2000, it emerged
as a basis for protecting cities and counties from liability in a variety
of situations extending beyond police protection.28 The doctrine
appeared in cases involving building inspection,29 land use planning,"
taxicab permitting,31 animal control, 2 and fire protection.33 Without
intervention by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, it appeared
there would be little limitation placed on the doctrine. "
28. See, e.g., Simmons v. City of Hickory, 126 N.C. App. 821, 823, 487 S.E.2d 583, 585
(1997) (holding that the public duty doctrine applied to bar a claim against the city for its
failure to find construction defects while inspecting homes and issuing building permits);
Davis v. Messer, 119 N.C. App. 44, 55-56, 457 S.E.2d 902, 909-10 (1995) (holding that the
public duty doctrine could be invoked in a claim against a fire chief, fire department, town,
and county for negligence in their failure to complete their effort to extinguish a fire in the
plaintiff's home, but finding them liable because the special duty exception applied);
Sinning v. Clark, 119 N.C. App. 515, 518-19, 459 S.E.2d 71, 73-74, (1995) (applying the
public duty doctrine to bar a claim against a municipality, the city building inspector, and
the city code administrator for gross negligence in the inspection of a home); Prevette v.
Forsyth County, 110 N.C. App. 754, 758, 431 S.E.2d 216, 218 (1993) (applying the public
duty doctrine to bar a wrongful death claim against the county, the director of the county
animal control shelter, and his employee for failing to protect the plaintiff from dogs
which the defendants knew were dangerous); Lynn v. Overlook Dev., 98 N.C. App. 75, 78,
389 S.E.2d 609, 611-12 (1990) (applying the public duty doctrine to bar liability of a city
and the city building inspector for negligence in inspecting the plaintiff's condominium).
But see Isenhour v. Hutto, 129 N.C. App. 596, 600, 501 S.E.2d 78, 81 (1998), affd on other
grounds, 350 N.C. 601, 517 S.E.2d 121 (1999) (denying a city the protection of the public
duty doctrine where "the relevant relationship was one between a crossing guard and an
elementary school student.... [because] a crossing guard's primary function is to ensure
the safety of a specific individual-each child who comes to the crossing guard seeking to
cross the street"). The court of appeals also applied the doctrine to bar a claim against the
Department of Correction, a state agency. See Humphries v. N.C. Dep't of Correction,
124 N.C. App. 545,548, 479 S.E.2d 27,28 (1996).
29. See Sinning, 119 N.C. App. at 518-19, 459 S.E.2d at 73-74; Lynn, 98 N.C. App. at
78, 389 S.E.2d at 612 (applying the public duty doctrine to negligent building inspection).
30. See Derwort v. Polk County, 129 N.C. App. 789, 792, 501 S.E.2d 379, 381 (1998)
(applying the public duty doctrine to a county's supervision of subdivision control
ordinances).
31. See Clark v. Red Bird Cab Co., 114 N.C. App. 400, 442 S.E.2d 75 (1994) (applying
the doctrine to claims against a city and several police officers for failure to properly
investigate the credentials of a taxi permit applicant).
32. See Prevette, 110 N.C. App. at 758, 431 S.E.2d at 218 (applying the doctrine to
protect an animal control shelter and its employees from liability for failing to protect a
citizen from dangerous dogs).
33. See Davis v. Messer, 119 N.C. App. 44, 457 S.E.2d 902 (1995) (holding the public
duty doctrine may be invoked as a town's defense to a claim for negligent fire protection
services).
34. It is possible that the court of appeals may have limited or abolished the public
duty doctrine if the judges believed they had the authority to do so. See Hull v. Oldham,
104 N.C. App. 29, 36, 407 S.E.2d 611, 615 (1991) (refusing to abolish the public duty
doctrine and stating that a court of appeals panel may not overrule a prior decision of a
different panel unless it has been overturned by a higher court). The results in Hull were
particularly harsh. In this case, the court held that the public duty doctrine barred suit
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B. The Public Duty Doctrine Anew: Stone and Hunt
Ten years after the introduction of the public duty doctrine into
North Carolina law, the state supreme court appeared to sanction the
lower courts' engorgement of the doctrine when it further broadened
the doctrine's parameters. In Stone v. North Carolina Department of
Labor35 the court considered whether the public duty doctrine applied
to claims brought against state agencies under the North Carolina
Tort Claims Act.36  Former employees and representatives of
individuals who died in a fire at a food products plant brought a
lawsuit alleging the State negligently failed to perform statutorily
required occupational safety inspections.37 The employees could not
escape the fire "because the exits in the plant were unmarked,
blocked, and inaccessible."38  After the fire, the North Carolina
Department of Labor (the "Department") and its Occupational
Safety and Health Division conducted their first and only inspection
in the plant's eleven-year history of operation. As a result of this
inspection, the Department issued eighty-three citations against the
plant for safety violations.39
The plaintiffs argued that section 95-4 of the General Statutes of
against a sheriff for failing to respond to calls advising that a mentally disturbed man
carrying a gun was threatening family members. Id. at 33, 407 S.E.2d at 613. The sheriff
and his deputies also misinformed the family of involuntary commitment procedures. The
man later went on a public shooting spree resulting in the death of three people. Id. at 33-
34, 407 S.E.2d at 613-14. The court stated there was no special duty to the victims because
there was never a promise made to the victims; the sheriffs had contact only with the
relatives of the killer. Id. at 37, 407 S.E.2d at 615. There could be no special relationship
between the victims and the police because the complaint did not allege any relationship
between the victims and the police. Id. Interestingly, the majority opinion of Hull was
authored by Judge Orr, later Justice Orr, who has argued vigorously against any expansion
of the doctrine in the Supreme Court of North Carolina. See Stone v. N.C. Dep't of
Labor, 347 N.C. 473,484,495 S.E.2d 711, 717 (1998) (Orr, J., dissenting).
35. 347 N.C. 473, 495 S.E.2d 711 (1998).
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-291 to 300.1 (1993) (amended 1994) (providing for suits
against state agencies). The case was properly brought against the Department of Labor
under the North Carolina Tort Claims Act, which was enacted in 1951 to partially waive
the State's sovereign immunity by allowing actions to be brought against the State in cases
where its employees are negligent in the course of their employment. Stone, 347 N.C. at
485, 495 S.E.2d at 718 (Orr, J., dissenting). Before the enactment of the Tort Claim Act,
the State enjoyed complete tort immunity under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Id.
(Orr, J., dissenting). The court of appeals previously answered this question of application
to state agencies in the affirmative. See Humphries v. N.C. Dep't of Corr., 124 N.C. App.
545, 479 S.E.2d 27 (1996) (holding the public duty doctrine barred a claim against the
Department of Correction under the North Carolina Tort Claims Act alleging negligence
in the government's supervision of a probationer under electronic house arrest).
37. Stone, 347 N.C. at 476-77, 495 S.E.2d at 713.
38. Id. at 477, 495 S.E.2d at 713.
39. Id.
THE PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE
North Carolina, "which describes the authority, power, and duties of
the Commissioner of Labor," imposed a duty upon the defendants to
inspect North Carolina workplaces and that the breach of this duty
gave rise to the plaintiff's action for negligence under the Tort Claims
Act." Although the defendants conceded that they had a statutory
obligation to inspect workplaces in North Carolina, they argued that
the duty was for the benefit of the public, not the individual
plaintiffs.41
The plaintiffs responded that the Tort Claims Act precluded
consideration of the common law public duty doctrine for two
reasons. First, the Tort Claims Act required the State to be held
liable in instances when a private person would be liable to claimants
under North Carolina law.42 Second, the public duty doctrine applied
only to claims against local governments for failure to prevent
crimes.43
The court began its inquiry by examining the legislative intent
behind the Tort Claims Act, stating: "In construing the Tort Claims
Act ... '[the] primary task is to ensure that the purpose of the
legislature, the legislative intent, is accomplished.' "4 The court
looked to the plain meaning of the statute and acknowledged that the
State is liable under circumstances in which a private person would be
liable. 5 Still, the court reasoned that the plain meaning was less than
determinative in the case at hand because "[p]rivate persons do not
possess public duties. '46  Only governmental entities possess the
authority to enact and enforce laws. The court explained, "[if] the
State were held liable for performing or failing to perform an
obligation to the public at large, the State would have liability when a
private person could not.
47
The Stone court also looked to rules of statutory construction for
40. Id.
41. Id. at 477, 495 S.E.2d at 714.
42. Id. at 478, 495 S.E.2d at 714; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-291 to 300.1 (1993)
(amended 1994).
43. Stone, 347 N.C. at 480, 495 S.E.2d at 715.
44. Id. at 478, 495 S.E.2d at 714 (quoting Elec. Supply Co. of Durham v. Swain Elec.
Co., 328 N.C. 651, 656,403 S.E.2d 291,294 (1991)).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 478, 495 S.E.2d at 714 (citing Grogan v. Commonwealth, 577 S.W.2d 4, 6
(Ky. 1979)). Grogan recognized that if a State could be legally liable for neglecting to
enforce laws and regulations establishing safety standards for construction and use of
buildings, the State's status as a governmental entity "would be the only basis for holding a
city or state liable, because only a governmental entity possesses the authority to enact
and enforce laws" for public safety. Grogan, 577 S.W.2d at 6.
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guidance, particularly those rules mandating that the "derogation of
sovereign immunity" and "[s]tatutes in derogation of the common
law" should be strictly construed.48 Applying these rules, the court
determined that absent clear legislative expression to the contrary, it
would construe the Tort Claims Act as incorporating common law
rules of negligence, including the common law public duty doctrine.49
Although conceding Braswell involved the application of the
public duty doctrine to local governments in their local law
enforcement duties, the court noted the many lower court decisions
that expanded the doctrine to include non-police protection cases.5"
The court further noted that the policies underlying recognition of the
public duty doctrine in Braswell were sub judice:
Just as we recognized the limited resources of law enforcement
in Braswell, we recognize the limited resources of defendants
here. Just as we there "refuse[d] to judicially impose an
overwhelming burden of liability [on law enforcement] for
failure to prevent every criminal act" ... we now refuse to
judicially impose an overwhelming burden of liability on
defendants for failure to prevent every employer's negligence
that results in injuries or deaths to employees. "[A]
government ought to be free to enact laws for the public
protection without thereby exposing its supporting taxpayers...
to liability for failures of omission in its attempt to enforce
them. It is better to have such laws, even haphazardly enforced,
than not to have them at all."'"
The court thereby proclaimed that although it had "not heretofore
applied the doctrine to a state agency or to a governmental function
other than law enforcement," it would do so now.52
The plaintiffs alleged the existence of neither a special duty owed
them by the Department nor a special relationship with the
Department.53  They could not have done otherwise. The
Department made no specific promises to protect the plaintiffs upon
which they had relied to their detriment; thus, a special duty could not
have existed. Moreover, no basis for claiming a special relationship
existed.54 The court found, therefore, no exception applied to bar the
48. Stone, 347 N.C. at 479, 495 S.E.2d at 714-15.
49. Id. at 479, 495 S.E.2d at 715.
50. Id. at 480-81,495 S.E.2d, 711, 715-16; see supra notes 28-33.
51. Id. at 481,495 S.E.2d at 716 (citations omitted).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 483, 495 S.E.2d at 717.
54. See Braswell v. Braswell, 330 N.C. 363, 371, 410 S.E.2d 897, 902 (1991); Coleman
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doctrine.55
Joined by Justice Frye, Justice Orr authored a forceful dissent in
Stone, in which he accused the majority of using "acrobatic
reasoning"56 by applying "a limited and obscure common law concept,
the public duty doctrine, which has traditionally applied only to
municipalities and their law enforcement responsibilities," and
expanding the doctrine to effectively eviscerate the Tort Claims Act.57
The dissenters argued four reasons why the public duty doctrine
should not be used to protect the State from liability for its negligent
failure to inspect workplaces as required under North Carolina law.58
First, the dissent seized upon the absence of supreme court precedent
to support extending the doctrine beyond the facts of Braswell, a suit
against a municipality for failure to. provide police protections. 9
Second, the dissent looked to the intent and language of the Tort
Claims Act. They argued that the court should not use the public
duty doctrine to grant the State immunity when the legislature, in
enacting the Tort Claims Act, sought to remove such immunity by
making the State liable for its wrongdoings." The dissent argued,
"[i]f the language concerning treatment like a private person had
been intended to mean what the majority says it means, i.e., that the
State receives [common law] immunity, the Act would have no
purpose" because the State was immune prior to the enactment of the
Act.6 Third, the dissent rejected the argument that the Tort Claims
Act incorporated common law, including the public duty doctrine,
because the public duty doctrine was not the common law of North
Carolina in 1951.62 Finally, the dissent also rejected the majority's
concern for imposing unreasonable liability burdens on the
government, pointing out that damages are capped under the Tort
Claims Act,63  and concluding "the majority's fear of an
'overwhelming burden of liability' has already been directly
addressed by the General Assembly, which has chosen, in its
v. Cooper, 89 N.C. App. 188, 194, 366 S.E.2d 2, 6 (1988) (discussing the special duty and
special relationship exceptions to the public duty doctrine).
55. Stone, 347 N.C. at 483,495 S.E.2d at 717.
56. Id. at 486, 495 S.E.2d at 719 (Orr, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 484, 495 S.E.2d at 717 (Orr, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 485-88, 495 S.E.2d at 718-20 (Orr, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 485,495 S.E.2d at 718 (Orr, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 486, 495 S.E.2d at 719 (Orr, J., dissenting).
61. Id.
62. See id. at 487, 495 S.E.2d at 719 (Orr, J., dissenting).
63. Id.
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legislative capacity, to limit liability as it deemed necessary. '' 4
In Hunt v. North Carolina Department of Labor,65 decided on the
heels of Stone, the court considered whether the public duty doctrine
barred a claim against the Department of Labor (the "Department")
by an eleven-year old who suffered severe injuries to his abdominal
area when his seat belt tightened during a go-kart ride at an
amusement park.66 The complaint alleged the Department employee,
who inspected the carts shortly before the accident, negligently
informed the owner that only lap belts needed to be installed on the
go-karts when, in fact, three-point shoulder-type harnesses were
required under Department regulations. 67 Relying on the reasoning
of Stone, the supreme court noted that, "having determined ... that
the public duty doctrine can apply to actions against state agencies
brought under the Tort Claims Act, we must determine applicability
of the public duty doctrine to [the specific facts of] this case. '68 The
court of appeals went on to hold that the North Carolina
Administrative Code imposed a duty on the Department to inspect
amusement devices to ensure compliance with the Administrative
Code and the Amusement Device Act, and concluded that a breach
of that duty could give rise to an action for negligence. 69 The majority
of justices on the supreme court disagreed.7" After reviewing the
statute imposing a duty on the Department to inspect amusement
devices, the supreme court determined that the legislature did not
intend to impose a duty to safeguard each individual go-kart
customer.7 To hold otherwise, said the court, would be "tantamount
to imposing liability on defendant in this case solely for inspecting the
go-karts and not discovering them to be in violation of the Code."72
64. Id. at 487-88; 495 S.E.2d at 720 (Orr, J., dissenting).
65. 348 N.C. 192, 499 S.E.2d 747 (1998), rev'g 125 N.C. App. 293, 480 S.E.2d 413
(1997).
66. Id. at 194, 499 S.E.2d at 748.
67. Id. at 195, 499 S.E.2d at 748. The plaintiff contended the Department had a duty
under the Amusement Device Safety Act. Id. (citing N.C. GEN STAT. §§ 95-111.1 to
111.18 (1997)). In addition, the plaintiff also claimed the defendant breached its duty
under the rules and regulations of the Administrative Code by failing to inform the
amusement park's manager that shoulder straps, as well as seat belts, must be mounted on
the go-karts. Id. (citing N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, r. 15.0429(a)(3)(B) (May 1992)).
68. Hunt v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 348 N.C. 192, 196, 499 S.E.2d 747, 749 (1998).
69. Hunt v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 125 N.C. App. 293, 297, 480 S.E.2d 413, 416 (1997)
(citing N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, r. 15.0405 (May 1992)).
70. Hunt, 348 N.C. at 199, 499 S.E.2d at 751.
71. Id. at 197, 499 S.E.2d at 750.
72. Id. at 198-99, 499 S.E.2d at 751. Interestingly, before Hunt, the supreme court
applied the public duty doctrine only to cases involving nonfeasance. See supra notes 16-
27 and 35-55. Nonfeasance is defined as " 'passive inaction or a failure to take steps to
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As in Stone, Justice Orr, joined by Justice Frye, vigorously
dissented. The dissenters pointed to the provisions of the
Amusement Device Safety Act, including section 95-111.18 of the
General Statutes of North Carolina,73 which reads in pertinent part:
"This Article and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder
shall receive a liberal construction to the end that the welfare of the
people may be protected. '74 Concluding that the legislature intended
to create a duty to specific individuals under the provisions, the
dissenters contended:
The practical effect of the majority opinion ... sends a chilling
message regarding the State's lack of accountability for its
negligent conduct and resulting injuries to innocent third
parties. Regardless of the fact that the legislature has imposed
a duty on the State either directly though legislation or
indirectly through administrative rule, regardless of the
evidence of negligence by the State in carrying out such duties,
regardless of the severity of injury to an innocent third party or
parties, and regardless of the fact that the legislature has
removed state immunity from suit under the Tort Claims Act,
the majority holds that the public duty doctrine allows the State
to escape liability for its negligence, and injured parties are thus
left with no means of recovery against the State. This was
clearly not the law before Stone, nor should it be now. 75
C. The Beginning of the End?: Isenhour, Lovelace, and Thompson
After broadening the doctrine in Hunt and Stone, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina applied the brakes to the public duty
doctrine,76 evidencing sympathy, if not solidarity, with a growing
protect [another] ... from harm,' " while misfeasance has been defined as " 'active
misconduct working positive injury to others.'" DAVID A. LOGAN & WAYNE A. LOGAN,
NORTH CAROLINA TORTS 8 (1996) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER &
KEETON ON TORTS § 56, at 373 (5th ed. 1984)). Hunt could well be described as a
misfeasance case because of the active negligence of the inspector in giving the
amusement park operator erroneous advice regarding the appropriate safety device
required. As such, the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction provided a basis for rejecting
the public duty doctrine in Hunt. However, neither the majority nor dissent spoke to that
issue. Thus, it appears that the Hunt court not only extended the type of defendant
covered by the public duty doctrine, but it also extended the type of harm covered.
73. Hunt, 348 N.C. at 201, 499 S.E.2d at 752 (Orr, J., dissenting) (citing N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 95-111.18 (1997)).
74. § 95-111.18.
75. Hunt, 348 N.C. at 200, 499 S.E.2d at 751-52 (Orr, J., dissenting) (citing Stone v.
N.C. Dep't of Labor, 347 N.C. 473,495 S.E.2d 711 (1998)).
76. See Lovelace v. City of Shelby, 351 N.C. 458, 526 S.E.2d 652 (2000); see also Willis
v. Town of Beaufort, 143 N.C. App. 106, 107, 544 S.E.2d 600, 602 (2001) (noting the
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national hostility against the doctrine.77 The court's initial notice of
retreat came in Isenhour v. Hutto,"8 when the court concluded the
public duty doctrine did not shield a city and school crossing guard
from liability for a child's death as a result of the guard's negligence
in directing the child to cross the street.79 In rejecting the application
of the doctrine, the court reasoned there was a "meaningful
distinction between application of the public duty doctrine to the
actions of local law enforcement, as in Braswell ... and the
application of the doctrine to the actions of a school crossing guard."8
The court noted, for example, "[t]he city, by providing school crossing
guards, ha[d] undertaken an affirmative, but limited, duty to protect
certain children, at certain times, in certain places .... [Thus, t]he
rationale underlying the public duty doctrine [was] simply
inapplicable to the allegations" of the school guard's negligence."
While refusing to apply the public duty doctrine to the facts of the
case before it, the court stopped short, however, of limiting the
doctrine's general applicability.8"
The court was less restrained in its two subsequent public duty
doctrine cases. In Lovelace v. City of Shelby,83 the court confronted
the public duty doctrine in a case involving fire protection, an activity
to which the lower courts previously applied the doctrine. 4 A police
supreme court limited the public duty doctrine in Lovelace v. City of Shelby thereby
overruling court of appeals's the extension of the doctrine to the municipal provision of
fire protection service).
77. See Ezell v. Cockrell, 902 S.W.2d 394, 398-99 (1995) (noting the trend away from
the public duty doctrine); see also Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976) (abolishing
the public duty doctrine in Alaska); Ryan v. State, 656 P.2d 597, 599 (Ariz. 1982)
(abolishing the public duty doctrine in Arizona); Jean W. v. Commonwealth, 610 N.E.2d
305, 307 (Mass. 1993) (abolishing the public duty doctrine in Massachusetts); Brennen v.
County of Eugene, 591 P.2d 719, 724 (Or. 1979) (abolishing the public duty doctrine in
Oregon). But see, e.g., City of Rome v. Jordon, 426 S.E.2d 351, 358 (Ga. 1993) (embracing
the public duty doctrine in Georgia); Tipton v. Town of Tabor, 567 N.W.2d 351, 358 (S.D.
1997) (embracing the public duty doctrine in South Dakota).
78. 350 N.C. 601,517 S.E.2d 121 (1999).
79. Id. at 607-08, 517 S.E.2d at 126.
80. Id.
81. Id. (noting that the application of the doctrine prevents excessive liability of
government agencies).
82. Id.
83. 351 N.C. 458, 526 S.E.2d 652 (2000).
84. See Davis v. Messer, 119 N.C. App. 44, 57, 457 S.E.2d 902, 910 (1995). In Davis,
homeowners brought a negligence action against the fire chief, fire department, town and
county when their home was destroyed by fire. The fire department dispatched a response
team, which departed for the plaintiffs' residence. Id. at 49, 457 S.E.2d 902, 905. When
the firefighters were in sight of the plaintiffs' home, however, they realized that the
burning residence was outsiae of their service area, and were told to turn around and
return to the fire station. Id. The firefighters returned to the station despite a mutual aid
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department employee serving as the operator to the 911 emergency
number received calls reporting that a residence was on fire. The
operator indicated that an emergency response would be
forthcoming.86 However, she delayed dispatching the fire department
for six minutes after she received the calls. 7 Consequently, the fire
department did not arrive at the scene until at least ten minutes after
the 911 calls were made, although the house was located only 1.1
miles from the fire station.88 A child died in the house fire after the
calls to 911 but before the fire department's arrival.8 9 The complaint
alleged that the operator's conduct breached a special duty and
promise of protection and was causally related to the child's death.9"
A superior court judge denied the city's claim that the public
duty doctrine applied to bar liability.91 The court of appeals reversed
and remanded.92  Reviewing this decision, the supreme court
acknowledged in a remarkably cursory fashion that it had extended
the public duty doctrine vis-A-vis state agencies in Hunt and Stone, but
observed it "never expanded the public duty doctrine to any local
government agencies other than law enforcement departments when
they are exercising their general duty to protect the public."93 The
court offered two conclusory bases for limiting the doctrine's
application to local governments. First, it pointed out that Braswell
involved law enforcement engaged in the exercise of general duties to
protect the public. 4 Second, the court noted this limitation to law
enforcement was consistent with the origin of the public duty doctrine
in the United States.95
On the same day the court issued the decision in Lovelace, it also
ruled that the public duty doctrine did not bar a homeowner's claim
agreement authorizing them to provide fire protection in the jurisdiction of the plaintiffs'
home. Id. The court of appeals held that the public duty doctrine applied in the case, but
the plaintiffs alleged facts sufficient to establish the special duty exception. Id. at 57, 457
S.E.2d 902, 910. The dispatcher made a specific promise to the plaintiffs that fire
protection was forthcoming, and they relied on that promise to their detriment. Id. at 56,
457 S.E.2d 902, 909-10.
85. Lovelace v. City of Shelby, 153 N.C. App. 378, 380, 570 S.E.2d 136, 137-38 (2002).
86. Lovelace v. City of Shelby, 133 N.C. App. 408, 409, 515 S.E.2d 722, 723 (1999).
87. Lovelace, 351 N.C. at 460, 526 S.E.2d at 654.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 459, 526 S.E.2d at 653.
91. Id. at 458, 526 S.E.2d at 653.
92. Lovelace v. City of Shelby, 133 N.C. App. 408, 515 S.E.2d 722 (1999).
93. Lovelace, 351 N.C. at 461, 526 S.E.2d at 654.
94. Id. (citing Braswell v. Braswell, 330 N.C. 363, 370, 410 S.E.2d 897, 901 (1991)).
95. Lovelace, 351 N.C. at 461, 526 S.E.2d at 653 (citing South v. Md. ex rel. Pottle, 59
U.S. (18 How.) 396 (1956)).
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against a county for alleged negligence in inspecting a home and
issuing a permit.96 The plaintiffs in Thompson v. Waters97 alleged
county building inspectors were grossly negligent in issuing a permit
for construction of a building with several structural defects, in
violation of the North Carolina State Building Code and good
building practice.98 The plaintiffs' outrage was exacerbated when two
weeks after the completion of construction, they received a report
from the county department of inspection outlining the numerous
structural defects and building code violations of the residence and
requiring remedial measures.99  Again the court confronted a
situation in which the lower courts previously applied the public duty
doctrine."' The court, however, reiterated its position as set out in
Lovelace-it had never "applied the public duty doctrine to a claim
against a municipality or county in a situation involving any group or
individual other than law enforcement.1 01 As in Lovelace, the court
denied application of the doctrine.
After Lovelace and Thompson, the apparent state of the public
duty doctrine stood as follows: State agencies could successfully
assert the public duty doctrine as a defense in cases involving the
failure to inspect. Local governments such as cities and counties,
however, could only use the doctrine to bar liability in cases involving
law enforcement departments exercising general duties to protect the
general public. 2
II. WOOD V. GUILFORD COUNTY
The decisions of the Supreme Court of North Carolina in
Lovelace and Thompson appeared to forecast that the court would
jealously guard the application of the public duty doctrine, at least in
its application to local governments. Surprisingly, the court's next
encounter with the doctrine belied both the forecast and the difficulty
of the doctrine's application.
Wood v. Guilford County presented the Supreme Court of North
96. Thompson v. Waters, 351 N.C. 462, 465,526 S.E.2d 650, 652 (2000).
97. 351 N.C. 462, 526 S.E.2d 650 (2000).
98. Id. at 463,526 S.E.2d at 650-51.
99. Id. at 463, 576 S.E.2d at 651.
100. See Lynn v. Overlook Dev., 98 N.C. App. 75, 78, 389 S.E.2d 609, 612 (1990)
(applying the public duty doctrine to bar a claim for negligent building inspection).
101. Thompson, 351 N.C. at 465,526 S.E.2d at 652.
102. Lovelace v. City of Shelby, 351 N.C. 458, 461, 526 S.E.2d 652, 653 (2000).
Moreover, the doctrine applied to protect state agencies even in cases involving
misfeasance. Hunt v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 348 N.C. 192, 195, 499 S.E.2d 747, 748 (1998).
There was no indication that local governments would be afforded similar latitude.
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Carolina with a jeweled opportunity to address the specific doctrinal
conflict festering in its own precedent and the generally disoriented
state of the law surrounding the public duty doctrine. Significant
questions loomed over Wood. The first issue was whether there was
any justification for the court's differing application of the public duty
doctrine depending on whether the defendant was the State of North
Carolina, as in Stone and Hunt, or a local government entity, as in
Lovelace and Thompson. The second question concerned the
potential inconsistency between the application of a judicially created
public duty doctrine and the North Carolina General Assembly's
legislative derogation of sovereign or governmental immunity. The
third question was whether the public duty doctrine provides liability
protection to local governments beyond that provided by immunity
laws and ordinary principles of negligence law. Rather than directly
addressing and resolving these questions, the court in Wood
attempted to craft an opinion purportedly consistent with all of its
earlier opinions. The glaring failures of the attempt invite criticism.
A. Facts and Procedural History
In Wood v. Guilford County,"3 Shelley Austin Wood brought
suit against her employer, Guilford County, after she was assaulted in
the county courthouse." Guilford County contended at the trial
court level that governmental immunity and the public duty doctrine
stood as complete bars to recovery for Ms. Wood's claim. 10 5 The
county moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim for
relief as required by the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.06
The trial court denied the motion, applying neither the public duty
doctrine nor governmental immunity."7  The county filed an
interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of its motion to the
North Carolina Court of Appeals.0 8
The primary issue considered on appeal was whether the public
duty doctrine barred Ms. Wood's claim against the county.109 The
103. 355 N.C. 161, 558 S.E.2d 490 (2002).
104. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
105. Wood, 355 N.C. at 163, 558 S.E.2d at 493. A detailed explanation of the
relationship between the public duty doctrine and governmental immunity follows infra
Part III.
106. Id. (citing N.C. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)).
107. Id.; see infra notes 137-147 and accompanying text for further discussion of
governmental immunity.
108. Wood, 355 N.C. at 163, 558 S.E.2d at 493.
109. Wood v. Guilford County, 143 N.C. App. 507, 510, 546 S.E.2d 641, 644 (2001).
The court determined the county waived governmental immunity by requiring Burns to
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court of appeals acknowledged' that "[g]enerally, a municipality and
its agents 'act[] for the benefit of the general public when exercising
[their] police powers, and therefore cannot be held liable for
negligence or gross negligence' in failing to furnish police protection
to specific individuals.""' The court held, however, that the county
''was not acting in a law enforcement capacity or exercising its general
duty to protect the public by providing security to the Courthouse,
but was acting as owner and operator of the Courthouse.""' The
judges on the appellate panel appeared to be faithfully upholding the
supreme court's decisions in Lovelace and Thompson that limited the
doctrine, as applied to local governments, to "law enforcement
departments when they are exercising their general duty to protect
the public.""' 2  The county appealed this holding to the supreme
court.
B. Decision of the Supreme Court of North Carolina
The Supreme Court of North Carolina found the strict fidelity of
the court of appeals to Lovelace and Thompson neither admirable
nor necessary and reversed. It held that the public duty doctrine did
protect Guilford County from liability for its alleged failure to guard
its courthouse employee from a criminal assault."3  The court
characterized the lower court's reading of the law as "an overly literal
reading of the limitations.., placed on the public duty doctrine as
applied to local governments in Lovelace and an overly narrow
interpretation of the doctrine ... as articulated in Braswell.""' 4
Searching for an outcome consistent "with the conceptual
underpinnings of the public duty doctrine," the court found three
related bases for holding that the public duty doctrine applied in the
case.' First, the court determined that a county provides court
security services as part of its general police functions, rather than as
purchase an indemnification insurance policy. Id.
110. Id. at 511, 546 S.E.2d at 645 (quoting Vanasek v. Duke Power Co., 132 N.C. App.
335, 337, 511 S.E.2d 41, 42 (1999), cert. denied, 350 N.C. 851, 539 S.E.2d 13 (1999)).
111. Id. at 512, 546 S.E.2d at 645. The court noted that pursuant to section 7A-302 of
the General Statutes of North Carolina, the county was under a statutory duty to provide
" 'courtrooms, office space ... and related judicial facilities.' " Id. (quoting N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-302 (1999)).
112. Wood, 143 N.C. App. at 512, 546 S.E.2d at 645 (citing Lovelace v. City of Shelby,
351 N.C. 458, 461, 526 S.E.2d 652, 654 (2000)); see also Thompson v. Waters, 351 N.C. 462,
465, 526 S.E.2d 650, 652 (2000) (limiting the doctrine to law enforcement departments
engaged in police protection of the public).
113. Wood, 355 N.C. at 169, 558 S.E.2d at 496.
114. Id. at 168, 558 S.E.2d 496.
115. Id. at 167, 558 S.E.2d at 495.
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the owner and operator of a building."'16 Second, the court held that
"the test of whether the public duty doctrine applies is a functional
one and includes consideration of the nature of the duty assumed by
the local governmental defendant.""' 7 And third, the court made it
clear that a county may receive the benefit of the public duty doctrine
when it contracts with a private entity to provide security services
instead of providing the services directly."' These three rather
unremarkable suppositions led to a decision that, while correct, belied
the complexity of the issues before the court.
The supreme court rejected the court of appeals ruling that the
public duty doctrine was inapplicable because Wood involved neither
a law enforcement department nor police protection as seemingly
required by Lovelace and Thompson."9 Although the plaintiff argued
that "the hired security guards were not sworn public officers with the
full panoply of authority reserved to those in law enforcement (i.e.,
the power to arrest, to investigate crimes, to operate the County jail,
to enforce safety statutes, and to serve warrants and civil court
documents),' 20 the supreme court rebuffed any focus on these factors
out of concern that doing so might result in an "overly narrow"
perspective of precedent.
1 21
The court next turned its attention to "the nature of the duty
assumed by the local government defendant.' 22 Observing that the
nature of the duty to provide space for judicial activity "render[ed]
the County an involuntary landlord by requiring it to provide
'courtrooms, office space.., and related judicial facilities' for the
state's judicial system,' 23 the court held the protective services
provided at the courthouse through the county's contract with Burns,
the security company, were analogous to the police protections
provided to the general public by local government law
enforcement. 24  The court found the duty to provide police
protection or more general protective services (as provided by Burns)
116. Id. at 168-69, 558 S.E.2d at 496 ("[T]he protective services provided at the
courthouse through the County's contract with Burns Security are analogous to the police
protection provided to the general public in Braswell.").
117. Id. at 168, 558 S.E.2d at 496.
118. See id.
119. Id. at 167-68, 558 S.E.2d at 495-96.
120. Id. at 167, 558 S.E.2d at 495 (acknowledging that it "previously delineated the




123. Id. at 167, 558 S.E.2d at 495 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-302 (2001)).
124. Id. at 168, 558 S.E.2d at 496.
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extended to the public at large, "including those members of the
public who worked at the courthouse," but did not inure to any
specific individual.2 1 Comparing the county's duty to protect Ms.
Wood to the crossing guard's limited duty to the school child in
Isenhour,126 the court determined protection that extended all day, to
an entire courthouse, encompassed all people entering the building,
and included general safeguarding from multiple hazards presented
precisely the type of "overwhelming burden of liability on
governmental agencies with limited resources" that the public duty
doctrine seeks to prevent. 27 As such, the court held that, given the
scope of protection the County provided through Burns in terms of
time, place, intended beneficiaries and purpose, the county owed no
specific duty to Ms. Wood.
12 8
The court observed that Ms. Wood's complaint failed to allege
either the existence of a special relationship or special duty, the two
recognized exceptions to the public duty doctrine. 29  Indeed, the
court insinuated that neither exception was really at issue given the
facts of the case. Examining each exception in turn, the court
determined that Ms. Wood's status as a courthouse employee did not
create a special relationship, and there was no evidence in the record
to suggest that the County assumed a special duty to her by making
any promises to protect her against third-party criminal assaults or
that any statute imposed a special duty. 3°
While addressing exceptions that were not at issue, the Wood
court ignored the important questions looming over the doctrine.
Notably, the court made no attempt to provide a justification for the
differing scopes of the public duty doctrine based on whether the
defendant was a local government or a state agency.' It simply
reiterated that for local governments, the doctrine would not be
expanded "beyond agencies other than local law enforcement
departments exercising their general duty to protect the public.' 32
125. Id. at 169, 558 S.E.2d at 496.
126. Isenhour v. Hutto, 350 N.C. 601, 607, 517 S.E.2d 121, 126 (1999) (finding a duty
"to protect certain children, at certain times, in certain places"); see supra notes 78-81 and
accompanying text.
127. Wood, 355 N.C. at 169, 558 S.E.2d at 496.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 170, 558 S.E.2d at 497.
130. Id. at 169-70; 558 S.E.2d at 497. The court also rejected the argument that by
hiring a security firm, the County created a special duty to courthouse tenants and their
employees. Id.
131. See Lovelace v. City of Shelby, 351 N.C. 458, 461, 526 S.E.2d 652, 654 (2000)
(setting forth the parameters of the public duty doctrine for local governments).
132. Wood, 355 N.C. at 166-67,558 S.E.2d at 495 (citing Thompson v. Waters, 351 N.C.
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Nor did the court seek to provide prospective litigants with any
guidance on additional local government services that were
"analogous to police protection to the general public.' 1 33 Indeed, by
leaving that language open to interpretation by the lower courts, the
supreme court may have inadvertently expanded the applicability of
the doctrine despite the valiant efforts to restrict it in Lovelace and
Thompson.
Moreover, in Stone and Hunt, the court considered and resolved,
albeit unconvincingly, the relationship between sovereign immunity
for the State and the public duty doctrine.'34 It had yet to speak to the
relationship between governmental immunity and the doctrine,
however. Still, the Wood court failed to consider whether the
legislature's abrogation of governmental immunity was consistent
with the public duty doctrine. Also absent from the court's analysis
was any consideration of the more fundamental questions
surrounding the doctrine: What is the real value of the doctrine to
defendants such as Guilford County? Does it provide needed liability
protections or needless confusion? The remainder of this Article
addresses the questions of whether judicial application of the public
duty doctrine contradicts legislative abrogation of governmental
immunity and whether other persuasive reasons exist to support
either the abolition or retention of the doctrine for local
governments.
III. THE PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE AND THE WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN
OR GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
A. Sovereign and Governmental Immunity in Context
The dissenting justices in Stone and Hunt criticize the majority's
expansion of the public duty doctrine to the State and its agencies on
the ground that the doctrine serves to eviscerate the legislature's
462, 464-65, 526 S.E.2d 650, 651-52 (2000); Lovelace, 351 N.C. at 461, 526 S.E.2d at 654).
133. Wood, 355 N.C. at 167, 558 S.E.2d at 495.
134. Hunt v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 348 N.C. 192, 196, 499 S.E.2d 747, 751 (1998); Stone
v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 347 N.C. 473, 483, 495 S.E.2d 711, 717 (1998); see also Scott J.
Borth, Comment, Municipal Tort Liability for Erroneous Issuance of Building Permits: A
National Survey, 58 WASH. L. REV. 537, 547-52 (1983) (pointing out that the first state to
abolish sovereign immunity was also the first state to adopt the public duty doctrine and
that as other states abrogated sovereign immunity the doctrine gained broader support);
Suzanne M. Dardis, Note, Gleason v. Peters, Resurrection of Sovereign Immunity, 43 S.D.
L. REV. 706, 728-30 (1998) (arguing that application of the public duty doctrine by the
judiciary contravenes legislative attempts to waive sovereign immunity).
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abrogation of sovereign immunity.135 A similar criticism has been
leveled at the doctrine's protection of local governments. 136  To
appreciate fully the significance of the criticism, one must first address
the greater issues of sovereign and governmental immunity under
North Carolina law.
The State of North Carolina is shielded from tort claims by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity.'37 As political subdivisions of the
State, local governments have governmental immunity, a limited
extension of sovereign immunity.1 38  Both sovereign and
governmental immunity rest on public policy considerations, which
suggest the State should not be forced to answer a lawsuit under the
very claims that it created. 139  Accordingly, a court will not enforce
these claims without the consent of the State.40
North Carolina, through the General Assembly, has consented to
claims against the State and its agencies, with some important
limitations, by partially abrogating sovereign immunity. 4' The Tort
Claims Act, codified in section 143-291 of the General Statutes of
North Carolina, provides:
The Industrial Commission shall determine whether or not each
individual claim arose as a result of the negligence of any
officer, employee, involuntary servant or agent of the State
135. Hunt, 348 N.C. at 200, 499 S.E.2d at 752 (Orr, J., dissenting); Stone, 347 N.C. at
484, 495 S.E.2d at 717 (Orr, J., dissenting).
136. Frank Swindell, Note, Municipal Liability for Negligent Inspections in Sinning v.
Clark: A "Hollow" Victory for the Public Duty Doctrine, 18 CAMPBELL L. REV. 241
(1996) (considering the connection between governmental immunity and the public duty
doctrine).
137. Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 789, 413 S.E.2d 276, 293-94 (1992), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 985 (1.992) (recognizing the states enjoy sovereign immunity). See
generally 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 237-45 (Wayne Morrison ed., 2001)
(discussing English common law of sovereign immunity).
138. See BROWN-GRAHAM, supra note 11, at 3-7. See, e.g., Sides v. Cabarrus Mem'l
Hosp., Inc, 287 N.C. 14, 213 S.E.2d 297 (1975) (holding that community hospitals are not
immune from liability because they perform a proprietary function rather than a
governmental function); Hamilton v. Town of Hamlet, 238 N.C. 741, 78 S.E.2d 770 (1953)
(holding that municipal governments have governmental immunity from liability "in the
exercise of police power, or judicial, discretionary, or legislative authority ... and when
discharging a duty imposed solely for the public benefit").
139. See Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 386, 389 (1850) ("No maxim is thought
to be better established, or more universally assented to, than that which ordained that a
sovereign ... cannot ex delicto be amendable to its own creatures or agents ... [without]
permission on the part of the sovereign.").
140. Id.
141. There is a statutory cap on damages under the Tort Claims Act. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 143-291(a) (2001.) (allowing claims against the State that would otherwise be
covered by sovereign immunity).
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while acting within the scope of his office, employment, service,
agency or authority, under circumstances where the State of
North Carolina, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the laws of North Carolina.
142
The State has authorized, but not required, its local governments
to waive the immunity that protects them from liability for
governmental activities. 43 If a local government chooses to purchase
liability insurance, it waives its immunity to the extent of its insurance
coverage.144
Governmental activities are those that are "discretionary,
political, legislative or public in nature and performed for the public
good in behalf of the State.' 45  On the other hand, proprietary
activities, for which there is no immunity, are "commercial or chiefly
for the private advantage of the compact community."' 146 Since local
142. Id. § 143-291(a) (2001).
143. See id. § 153A-435(a) (2001) (allowing counties to procure insurance and limiting
liability for counties); § 160A-485(a) (allowing municipalities to procure insurance and
limiting liability for municipalities).
144. Id.
145. Millar v. Town of Wilson, 222 N.C. 340, 341, 23 S.E.2d 42, 44 (1942).
146. Id. Courts typically look to the following factors in determining whether a
particular activity is governmental or proprietary in nature. First, courts have held
activities historically performed by the government rather than by private corporations to
be governmental functions. Sides v. Cabarrus Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 287 N.C. 14, 23, 213
S.E.2d 297, 303 (1975). See, e.g., Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 186
S.E.2d 897 (1972) (discussing the administration of sanitation programs); Dale v. City of
Morganton, 270 N.C. 567, 155 S.E.2d 136 (1967) (discussing condemnation of property);
Siebold v. Kinston-Lenoir County Pub. Library, 264 N.C. 360, 141 S.E.2d 519 (1965)
(explaining the operation of libraries is governmental); Denning v. Goldsboro Gas Co.,
246 N.C. 541, 98 S.E.2d 910 (1957) (examining the grant of franchises); N.C. ex rel. Hayes
v. Billings, 240 N.C. 78, 81 S.E.2d 150 (1954) (discussing the operation of county jails);
Hamilton v. Town of Hamlet, 238 N.C. 741, 78 S.E.2d 770 (1953) (examining the operation
and maintenance of traffic lights); Lewis v. Hunter, 212 N.C. 504, 193 S.E. 814 (1937)
(discussing driving a police car); Cathey v. City of Charlotte, 197 N.C. 309, 148 S.E. 426
(1929) (examining the use of a police or fire alarm); Howland v. City of Asheville, 174
N.C. 749, 94 S.E. 524 (1917) (discussing furnishing water to firefighters); James v. City of
Charlotte, 183 N.C. 630, 112 S.E.2d 423 (1900) (examining the administration of sanitation
programs); Whitaker v. Clark, 109 N.C. App. 379, 427 S.E.2d 142 (1993) (finding the
administration of social services programs to be governmental in nature); Orange County
v. Heath, 14 N.C. App. 44, 187 S.E.2d 345 (1972), affd, 282 N.C. 292, 192 S.E.2d 308
(1972) (noting that enforcement of zoning regulations is governmental in nature); Stone v.
City of Fayetteville, 3 N.C. App. 261, 164 S.E.2d 542 (1968) (discussing storm drainage
maintenance).
Second, activities that are proprietary typically involve a monetary charge of some
sort. See, e.g., Sides, 287 N.C. at 203, 213 S.E.2d at 303 (discussing the operation of a
county hospital); Koontz, 280 N.C. 513, 186 S.E.2d 897 (examining the maintenance of a
landfill by fee); Foust v. City of Durham, 239 N.C. 306, 79 S.E.2d 519 (1954) (discussing
water distribution for profit), Rice v. City of Lumberton, 235 N.C. 227, 69 S.E.2d 543
(1952) (examining the distribution of electricity for profit), Rhodes v. City of Asheville,
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governmental units enjoy no immunity for harms resulting from
proprietary acts, 47 the purchase of insurance has no effect on liability
exposure for proprietary acts.
B. The Contradiction Between the Application of the Public Duty
Doctrine and the Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity
If anything emerges with clarity in the law of public liability, it is
the principle that "[w]aiver of sovereign immunity may not be lightly
inferred and state statutes waiving this immunity, being in derogation
of the sovereign right to immunity, must be strictly construed.' 1 48 The
majority opinions of Hunt and Stone purport to invoke this principle,
but this invocation is highly problematic because it appears to conflict
with the clear intent of the North Carolina General Assembly in
enacting the Tort Claims Act.'49 As the dissenting justices in Hunt
and Stone impressively argue, the effect of the public duty doctrine is
to bar liability in cases in which the legislature has declared liability
may exist. 150 For this reason, the dissenters argue the doctrine is
230 N.C. 134, 52 S.E.2d 371 (1949) (discussing the operation of an airport) and Lowe v.
City of Gastonia, 211 N.C. 564, 191 S.E. 7 (1937) (examining the operation of a municipal
golf course).
The fact that a fee is charged does not necessarily mean, however, that the activity
is proprietary. Services that are governmental based on other considerations are not made
proprietary merely because a cost of the service is charged to a recipient. Casey v. Wake
County, 45 N.C. App. 522, 263 S.E.2d 360 (1980). If the local government is charging fees
to the extent that a profit is being made, however, the court will consider such profit
strong evidence that the activity is proprietary. See Hare v. Butler, 99 N.C. App. 693, 394
S.E.2d 231 (1990); Waters v. Biesecker, 60 N.C. App. 253, 255, 298 S.E.2d 746, 747 (1983),
affid 309 N.C. 165, 305 S.E.2d 539 (1983) ("[a]lthough the term 'proprietary' denotes a
profit motive, profit motive is not essential to the determination that a function by a
governmental body is proprietary").
Third, when a municipality engages in a public enterprise essentially for the
benefit of its compact community, it is acting within its proprietary nature. Any activity of
a municipality that is commercial or performed chiefly for the private advantage of the
compact community is a proprietary function. An example is the operation of off-street
parking facilities. See Britt v. City of Wilmington, 236 N.C. 446, 73 S.E.2d 289 (1952).
Finally, a local government activity may be of such benefit to the State that public
policy requires that it be classified as governmental even though citizens of the
municipality benefit more from the activity than do citizens of the state in general. An
example is sewerage, which is considered a governmental function in recognition of
statewide public health concerns. See McCombs v. City of Asheboro, 6 N.C. App. 234, 170
S.E.2d 169 (1969).
147. See Millar, 222 N.C. at 341, 23 S.E.2d at 44.
148. Kennedy v. Haywood County, - N.C. App .... 581 S.E.2d 119, 120 (2003)
(citing Guthrie v. State Ports Auth., 307 N.C. 522, 537-38, 299 S.E.2d 618, 627 (1983)).
149. See Hunt v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 348 N.C. 192, 196, 499 S.E.2d 747, 749 (1998);
Stone v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 347 N.C. 473,479, 495 S.E.2d 711, 715 (1998).
150. See Hunt, 348 N.C. at 200, 499 S.E.2d at 751-52 (Orr, J., dissenting); Stone, 347
N.C. at 486-87, 495 S.E.2d at 719 (Orr, J., dissenting).
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inconsistent with the legislative abrogation of sovereign immunity
through the Tort Claims Act.151 This argument finds judicial support
from a growing number of courts in other jurisdictions. Viewing the
doctrine "as an operation of sovereign immunity under a new
identity,' 5 2 these courts have determined that the public duty
doctrine should not survive legislative abolition of sovereign
immunity.
5 3
The 1976 landmark case of Adams v. State154 provides the earliest
record of a state court's rejection of the public duty doctrine.' In
Adams, the Supreme Court of Alaska criticized the doctrine as
reinstituting immunity for the State against the clear mandate of the
legislature. 56 Similarly, in Ryan v. State,157 the Supreme Court of
Arizona rejected the doctrine as a "bright new word-package" that
operated to reinstate sovereign immunity.158
The Massachusetts courts, too, rejected a judicially created
public duty doctrine in the face of legislative abrogation of sovereign
immunity.'59 The reasoning of that state's highest court is particularly
compelling. In 1978, the Massachusetts legislature partially waived
the Commonwealth's sovereign immunity by enacting the
Massachusetts Tort Claims Act ("MTCA"). 16° With language very
similar to that found in North Carolina's Tort Claims Act, the MTCA
provides that:
Public employers shall be liable for injury or loss of property or
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act
or omission of any public employee while acting within the
151. See Hunt, 348 N.C. at 200, 499 S.E.2d at 751-52 (Orr, J., dissenting); Stone, 347
N.C. at 486, 495 S.E.2d at 719 (Orr, J., dissenting).
152. Hudson v. Town of Montpelier, 638 A.2d 561, 566 (Vt. 1993) (noting that the
doctrine recently "has been rejected or abolished by most courts that have considered it");
see also Jean W. v. Commonwealth, 610 N.E.2d 305, 312 (Mass. 1993) (Liacos, C.J.,
concurring) (noting that the "trend has been to abolish the [public duty] rule"); see also
Dardis, supra note 134, at 728-30 (arguing the inconsistency of the public duty doctrine
with legislative abrogation of sovereign immunity); Swindell, supra note 136, at 248-50
(considering the connection between sovereign immunity and the public duty doctrine).
153. See Hunt, 348 N.C. at 196, 499 S.E.2d at 749; Stone, 347 N.C. at 479, 495 S.E.2d at
715.
154. 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976).
155. Id. at 241-42 (abolishing the judicially enforced public duty doctrine in favor of
the statutory scheme of governmental liability).
156. Id.
157. 656 P.2d 597 (Ariz. 1982).
158. Id. at 598.
159. Jean W. v. Commonwealth, 610 N.E.2d 305, 316 (Mass. 1993) (Liacos, C.J.,
concurring).
160. Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 25F § 2 (1978).
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scope of his office or employment, in the same manner and to
the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances.161
In 1993, in Jean W. v. Commonwealth,62 the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts held the public duty rule was inconsistent
with the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act. 63  "In addition to the
confusion engendered by the inconsistent application of the public
duty rule, the [Chief Justice's concurring opinion] likened the rule's
comprehensiveness to the 'antiquated and outmoded concepts of
sovereign immunity' that the court and legislature had shed. .... "" If
the Massachusetts legislature intended for public employees to be
treated in the same way as private individuals, as indicated by the
MTCA, then, reasoned the court, the public duty doctrine had to be
eliminated. 165  The court invited the Massachusetts legislature to
codify the public duty rule if it so desired, making clear that it would
not continue to apply the doctrine without word from the legislature.
North Carolina's legislature has not codified or otherwise
recognized the public duty doctrine, and the courts need not seek
advice from the General Assembly to clarify the relationship between
sovereign immunity and the public duty doctrine. 66 However, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina might consider following the
Massachusetts court's lead by asking the legislature for guidance.
The North Carolina legislature might in turn join the Massachusetts
legislature in accepting the invitation to codify the public duty
doctrine. 67 If so, the North Carolina courts would no longer need to
resort to the "acrobatic reasoning" of Hunt and Stone to conclude
against the tide of most state courts that have recently considered the
161. Compare MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 258, § 2 (Law. Co-op. 1992) (noting the liability
of public employers), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291(a) (2001) (providing for state tort
liability).
162. 610 N.E.2d 305 (Mass. 1993).
163. Id. at 307 (Liacos, C.J., concurring).
164. Kevin M. Barry, Brum v. Town of Dartmouth and the Public Duty Rule:
Navigating an Interpretive Quagmire, 41 B.C. L. REV. 383, 407 (2000) (quoting Jean W. v.
Commonwealth, 610 N.E.2d 305, 307 (Mass. 1993) (Liacos, C.J., concurring)).
165. Jean W., 610 N.E.2d at 312.
166. See Steelman v. City of New Bern, 279 N.C. 589, 594-95, 184 S.E.2d 239, 242-43
(1971) (indicating that the court would not modify or repeal a doctrine of immunity that
has been recognized as the public policy of the state by the General Assembly).
167. See Joseph W. Glannon, Liability for "Public Duties" Under the Tort Claims Act:
The Legislature Reconsiders the Public Duty Rule, 79 MASS L. REV. 17, 21 (1994)
(explaining the Massachusetts legislature accepted the invitation and amended the
Massachusetts Tort Claims Act in 1993 to protect public employees from liability in
situations previously covered by the common law public duty rule).
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continued validity of the public duty doctrine. 68 If the North
Carolina legislature were to codify or recognize the public duty
doctrine, there would be no question that in North Carolina the
public duty doctrine is consistent with legislative derogation of
sovereign immunity. In the face of a legislative or even judicial
determination that continued application of the public duty doctrine
is not consistent with legislative abrogation of sovereign immunity,
the question remains, however, whether this conclusion would also
bar the defense for local governments in North Carolina.
C. Reconciling the Public Duty Doctrine with Governmental
Immunity
Commentators have argued that the public duty doctrine's
application to local governments conflicts with the North Carolina
General Assembly's waiver of governmental immunity.'69  The
argument is analogous to the rejection of the public duty doctrine for
state agencies in the face of the Tort Claims Act. However, it finds
no similar support in law or reason.' ° To start, the North Carolina
legislature has not sought to waive governmental immunity. The
legislature has provided, instead, that local governments may, if they
so choose, waive governmental immunity through the purchase of
liability insurance. More particularly, the applicable statutes
authorize a city or county to insure itself and any of its officers,
agents, and employees against liability and to require governing
boards to determine what liabilities and what officers, agents, and
employees shall be covered by any insurance purchased. 1 ' "Absent
waiver, governmental immunity still provides an absolute defense to
168. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
169. Swindell, supra note 136, at 241-45; see also Note, Tort Law-The Public Duty
Doctrine: Should it Apply in the Face of Legislative Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity?-
Coleman v. Cooper, 12 CAMPBELL L. REV. 503, 503-04 (1990) (noting the conflict
between the North Carolina legislature and courts regarding governmental immunity).
170. The courts inadvertently have contributed to this argument by carelessly
suggesting that the public duty doctrine is a function of governmental immunity. See
Block v. Person, 141 N.C. App. 273, 540 S.E.2d 415 (2000) (indicating that a defendant
asserted "governmental immunity from suit through the public duty doctrine"). If this
function existed, then a waiver of governmental immunity would necessarily constitute a
waiver of the public duty doctrine. Thus, judicial application of the doctrine would be
inconsistent with a local legislature's decision to waive governmental immunity. Since no
court, however, has explicitly tied a waiver of governmental immunity to a waiver of the
public duty doctrine, one can only assume that the courts do not mean what they say.
171. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-435(a) (2001) (allowing counties to procure insurance);
id. § 160A-485(a)-(b) (allowing municipalities to procure insurance).
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municipalities against tort liability.' 1 72 As such, any argument that
the public duty doctrine is inconsistent with a waiver of governmental
immunity must rest on the local government's decision to waive the
immunity rather than the State's provision of the option to waive the
immunity. Those who conclude that a state statute authorizing a
waiver of immunity through the purchase of liability insurance is
inconsistent with the public duty doctrine appear to assume that the
statute operates as a conditional waiver of immunity-that is,
immunity is waived unless the entity fails to purchase insurance.173 A
more reasonable reading of North Carolina's governmental immunity
waiver statutes suggests they be considered a permissive waiver-that
is, the legislature has delegated the discretion to waive governmental
immunity to local governments under prescribed circumstances.
Moreover, the dissent in Stone sets out four convincing reasons
to support the contention that the doctrine is inconsistent with
sovereign immunity. None applies to suggest local waiver of
governmental immunity eviscerates the public duty doctrine. First,
unlike the waiver for the State of North Carolina and its agencies,
there is no language in section 153A-435(a) or section 160A-485(a) of
the General Statutes of North Carolina to suggest that the legislature
intended for local governments to be liable as "if a private person.'
1 74
Thus, the language upon which the dissent in Hunt and Stone seize to
so persuasively argue for the abrogation of the public duty doctrine
for state agencies is not at issue for local governments. 175 Second, the
court has maintained for over two decades that the doctrine applies to
local governments, even in the face of local waiver of governmental
immunity. In fact, the dissent in Stone appears to argue for limiting
the doctrine to "municipalities and their law enforcement
responsibilities" even in the face of governmental immunity. 7 6 Third,
local governments are not protected from astronomical damage
awards by a statutory cap on damages. Instead, damages are limited
172. Swindell, supra note 136, at 165.
173. See, e.g., Dardis, supra note 134, at 728 (arguing the application of the public duty
doctrine by the judiciary contravenes legislative attempts to waive sovereign immunity);
Swindell, supra note 136, at 241-45 (considering the connection between governmental
immunity and the public duty doctrine).
174. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-435(a) (providing for waiver of governmental
immunity by the purchase of insurance); id. § 160A-485(a) (same); cf id. § 143-291(a)
(providing that the State may be held liable in limited circumstances as if it were a private
person).
175. Hunt v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 348 N.C. 192, 200, 499 S.E.2d 747, 751-52 (1998)
(Orr, J., dissenting); Stone v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 347 N.C. 473, 484, 495 S.E.2d 711, 717
(1998) (Orr, J., dissenting).
176. Stone, 347 N.C. at 484, 495 S.E.2d at 717 (Orr, J., dissenting).
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by the extent of insurance coverage. The effect, then, of abrogating
the public duty doctrine when local governments waive governmental
immunity would be to discourage the purchase of liability insurance-
a result that stands in direct contradiction to the legislature's
authorization. Finally, the Stone dissent argues that the public duty
doctrine was not the common law of the state prior to the enactment
of the Tort Claims Act and waiver of sovereign immunity.'77
However, the doctrine has been the common law of this state since
1988.178 By the very reasoning of the Stone dissent, therefore, local
governments currently waiving their governmental immunity through
the purchase of liability insurance should be able to factor current
common law into their assessment of liability exposure.
IV. A MATI'ER MOSTLY OF INCONSEQUENCE FOR LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS?
A. Duplicating Governmental Immunity
While some have questioned the harmony between the public
duty doctrine and a waiver of governmental immunity, others have
questioned the need for the public duty doctrine's protections in cases
in which governmental immunity has not been waived.'79 Specifically,
courts have raised questions about the value of the doctrine given the
broader protections available under governmental immunity. 180
Recognizing the complex and confusing state of the law surrounding
the public duty doctrine, these courts suggested that its continued
177. Id. at 487, 495 S.E.2d at 719 (Orr, J., dissenting).
178. Braswell v. Braswell, 330 N.C. 363, 370-71, 410 S.E.2d 897, 901 (1991).
179. See, e.g., Beaudrie v. Henderson, 631 N.W.2d 308, 315 (Mich. 2001) (Cavanaugh,
J., concurring) (recognizing that the need for the doctrine might be undermined by an
expanded governmental immunity statute but continuing to apply the doctrine in police
protections cases); Hudson v. E. Montpelier, 638 A.2d 561, 568 (Vt. 1993) (declining to
adopt the confusing and inconsistent public duty doctrine as a means of limiting liability of
government employees already protected by immunity). See generally Emily Hammond,
Note, Government Liability When Cyclists Hit the Road. Same Roads, Same Rights,
Different Rules, 35 GA. L. REV. 1051, 1068 (2001) (illustrating similar outcomes under the
public duty doctrine and governmental immunity); Grant P.H. Shuman, Note, Common
Law Tort Immunity for State Officials in West Virginia After the Parkulo v. West Virginia
Board of Probation Decision, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 261, 284 (2000) (recognizing that the
public duty doctrine achieves the same result as governmental immunity).
180. See, e.g., Beaudrie, 631 N.W.2d at 315 ("[T]he need for an expanded application of
the public duty doctrine has been undermined by the protections afforded governmental
employees by our state's broad governmental immunity statute."); Hudson, 638 A.2d at
568 (questioning whether the doctrine limits "the liability of government employees who
are already protected to some extent by the doctrine of qualified official immunity").
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viability should be evaluated in light of the value of its protections. 8'
As the dissents point out in Hunt and Stone, the effect of the
doctrine is highly and consistently determinative of liability for the
State of North Carolina and its agencies because it bars liability even
in cases for which the state Tort Claims Act has authorized liability.
The value of the doctrine to local governments, however, turns on
whether the local government has waived its governmental
immunity."s2 In cases in which governmental immunity has not been
waived, the public duty doctrine provides no additional liability
protection to that already afforded local governments by
governmental immunity. Law enforcement has long been deemed a
governmental activity and unless the local government waives its
immunity through the purchase of insurance, it cannot be held liable
for harm caused to citizens.183 Thus, Guilford County could not have
181. Id.
182. This Article focuses on the public duty doctrine's applicability to governmental
entities. It is true, however, that the doctrine is also available to individual public servants
and, in such cases, the status of the defendant determines the utility of the doctrine. In
North Carolina, different standards of liability apply to public servants deemed to be
public officers than to public servants deemed to be public employees. Harwood v.
Johnson, 92 N.C. App. 306, 309, 374 S.E.2d 401, 404 (1988), affd in part, rev'd in part on
other grounds, 326 N.C. 231, 388 S.E.2d 439 (1990). A public officer is shielded from
liability for injuries arising from the exercise of a discretionary act while engaged in a
governmental activity, unless the officer acted with malice, for corrupt reasons, or outside
the scope of his or her official duties. Id. (quoting Wiggins v. City of Monroe, 73 N.C.
App. 44, 49, 326 S.E.2d 39, 43 (1985)). Public employees, on the other hand, may be held
liable for mere negligence. Id. As a result of the insulation from personal liability
afforded public officers, the distinction between officers and employees is an important
one.
Sworn law enforcement officers are public officers. See State v. Hord, 264 N.C.
149, 156-57 141 S.E.2d 241,246 (1965). Employees not bound by the police officer oath of
duty to protect and serve the public are typically deemed employees. See Lewis v. Hunter,
212 N.C. 504, 509, 193 S.E.2d 814, 817 (1937) (finding police department personnel who
operate radios to be employees). If the public duty doctrine is to be limited to local
governments in negligence cases arising out of law enforcement engagement in police
protection, public officer immunity should almost always apply to protect sworn officers.
See Clark v. Red Bird Cab Co., 114 N.C. App. 400, 406, 442 S.E.2d 75, 79 (1994)
(establishing that the public duty doctrine applies to claims of negligence but not
intentional torts). This would be true even in cases involving allegations of malice based
on grossly negligent, reckless or wanton misconduct. See Robinette v. Barriger, 116 N.C.
App. 197, 203, 447 S.E.2d 498, 502 (1994) (holding that allegations of reckless indifference
are insufficient to overcome public official immunity); Reid v. Roberts, 112 N.C. App. 222,
225,435 S.E.2d 116, 120 (1993) (holding that a claim of gross negligence is not sufficient to
overcome public official immunity to survive motion to dismiss). But see Givens v. Sellars,
273 N.C. 44, 49-50, 159 S.E.2d 530, 535 (1968) (suggesting allegations of reckless
indifference may be sufficient to overcome public official immunity). The doctrine would
not apply, however, to protect public employees of law enforcement departments. Lewis,
212 N.C. at 509, 193 S.E.2d at 817.
183. The Wood court did not reach the issue of whether governmental immunity
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been held liable for Ms. Wood's injuries unless it consented to such
liability by waiving its immunity.
However, under current law, if Guilford County waived its
governmental immunity, the public duty doctrine would still act as a
bar to liability. The public duty doctrine could be criticized,
therefore, as imposing an effective bar to recovery by citizens in
situations in which local policymakers have determined that their
local government entity should be held liable and have taken
affirmative steps to provide a resource base for recovery. It is more
likely the case, however, that local policymakers factor the public
duty doctrine's protections into their on-going decisions to waive
governmental immunity. Without the doctrine's protections, these
policymakers would probably resort to the more expansive
protections of governmental immunity by not purchasing liability
insurance. In this way, the doctrine may have both significant value
to local governments and benefits for prospective plaintiffs.
B. Applying a Traditional Negligence Framework
Courts have articulated concern about the needless confusion in
the law of public duty doctrine and have maintained that the conduct
it seeks to protect is better served by traditional tort principles."8
Indeed, even courts that have retained the doctrine for limited
purposes, such as the Michigan Supreme Court, have noted, "a
traditional common-law duty analysis provides a far more familiar
protected Guilford County from liability because consideration of governmental immunity
would have been appropriate only if the public duty had been found to be inapplicable. If
the court found that the public duty doctrine did not apply, it would have followed the
course of inquiry of the court of appeals and determined first, whether the County
engaged in a governmental activity and second, if so, whether the County waived its
governmental immunity. Law enforcement has long been deemed a governmental activity
in North Carolina. See Lewis, 212 N.C. 504, 509, 193 S.E. 814, 817 (1937). The County
waived its governmental immunity through the indemnification insurance purchased by
Burns, the security company. Wood v. Guilford County, 143 N.C. App. 507, 512-13, 546
S.E.2d 641, 645-46 (2001).
184. Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 158 (Colo. 1986) (reasoning that the underlying
purposes of the public duty rule are "better served by the application of conventional tort
principles and the protection afforded by statutes governing sovereign immunity than by a
rule that precludes a finding of an actionable duty on the basis of the defendant's status as
a public entity"); see Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976); Ryan v. State, 656 P.2d
616 (Ariz. 1982); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla.
1979); Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1979); Schear v. Bd. of County Comm'rs,
687 P.2d 728 (N.M. 1984); Brennen v. City of Eugene, 591 P.2d 719 (Or. 1979); Coffey v.
City of Milwaukee, 247 N.W.2d 132 (Wis. 1976). But see Jean W. v. Commonwealth, 610
N.E.2d 305, 315 (Mass. 1993) (Liacos, C., concurring) (cautioning that abolition of the
public duty rule would not be an analytical panacea, since many of the same conflicting
considerations would reemerge in the causation element of the plaintiffs' tort claims).
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and workable framework for determining whether a public employee
owes a tort-enforceable duty in a given case."' 5 Under a common
law analysis, tort law imposes a duty upon everyone to use reasonable
care when an action creates a foreseeable risk of harm to some person
or class of persons.'86 Thus, in the absence of governmental
immunity, in Wood v. Guilford County, the County would be liable
under a traditional negligence framework only if Ms. Wood could
show a duty of reasonable care, breach of that duty, causation and
damages.'87 These traditional requirements of negligence liability
impose formidable obstacles for a plaintiff, such as Ms. Wood,
seeking to impose liability on a local government for failure to
prevent the criminal act of a third person.
It appears Ms. Wood could not have surmounted the first
obstacle-the requirement of a duty. The Wood court characterized
the case as one of misfeasance, specifically the failure to provide
police protection.88 In the absence of actual or constructive notice of
danger, there is no duty to protect others against the criminal acts of a
third person."' The test for determining whether a duty to safeguard
others from the criminal acts of a third person would be imposed on a
proprietor turns on foreseeability 9 ° If the County had no reason to
foresee the danger to Ms. Wood and she could point to no other basis
for imposing a duty, the county could not be liable for failing to
185. Beaudrie, 631 N.W.2d at 315 (Cavanaugh, J., concurring).
186. See Mark McLean Myers, Comment, A Unified Approach to State and Municipal
Tort Liability in Washington, 59 WASH. L. REV. 533, 539 (1984) (contrasting traditional
tort duty analysis focusing on foreseeability with public duty doctrine's requirement of a
special relationship).
187. See CHARLES E. DAYE & MARK W. MORRIS, NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF
TORTS § 16.20 (2d ed. 1999) (setting forth the general elements for a prima facie
negligence cause of action under North Carolina law); Stephanie M. Bonnett, Comment,
Holsten v. Massey: The Co-existence of the Public Duty Doctrine and the Governmental
Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act, 100 W. VA. L. REV. 243, 266 (1997) ("[T]he mere
existence of a duty does not give rise to liability: There must be a breach, proximate
cause, and damages.").
188. Wood v. Guilford County, 355 N.C. 161,167-69,558 S.E.2d 490,495-96 (2002).
189. Miller v. B.H.B. Enters., Inc., 152 N.C. App. 532, 541, 568 S.E.2d 219, 225 (2002)
(emphasis omitted) (citing Murrow v. Daniels, 321 N.C. 494, 500, 364 S.E.2d 392, 397
(1988)) (holding that "a proprietor of a public business establishment has a duty to
exercise reasonable or ordinary care to protect his patrons from intentional injuries by
third persons, if he has reason to know that such acts are likely to occur"). The same facts
often present problems for plaintiffs seeking demonstrative causation. See Foster v.
Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 303 N.C. 636, 638, 281 S.E.2d 36, 38 (1981) ("It is usually
held that [criminal acts of third persons] cannot be reasonably foreseen by the owner [of
property], and therefore constitute an independent, intervening cause absolving the owner
of liability.").
190. Murrow, 321 N.C. at 501,364 S.E.2d at 397.
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protect her. Recent case law suggests that to demonstrate
foreseeability an employee seeking to hold an employer liable for the
criminal activity of a third person should "present evidence of
significant criminal activity on the premises to show that the security
methods assured by [the] defendant were inadequate." '191 The facts in
Wood did not suggest prior criminal activity or that the security being
provided was unreasonable as a matter of law. Indeed, the best
evidence that Ms. Wood would not have been able to make a showing
of foreseeability against the county is the fact that she was unable to
do so against Burns, the private security company. The trial court
entered an order for summary judgment in favor of Burns in June
1999 on grounds that included a finding that the plaintiff failed to
establish that she was owed a duty by Burns.1 92
Given the outcome of Ms. Wood's claim against Burns, one
might question the advantages of analyzing the case under the public
duty doctrine rather than under traditional tort principles. The
primary advantages lie in the procedure rather than the outcome of a
negligence case. The applicability of the public duty doctrine is a
question of law to be raised at the pleading stage of a case. Issues of
foreseeability and proximate cause, on the other hand, are usually
reserved for the jury.1 93 Moreover, a local government defendant may
immediately appeal a lower court's rejection of the public duty
doctrine as a bar to liability. This is unusual. Typically, where the
lower court's order does not dispose of the case, no appeal is
available.'94 However, an appeal may be heard "if the trial court's
decision deprives the appellant of a substantial right which would be
lost absent immediate review." 95 North Carolina's courts have held
191. Williams v. Smith, 149 N.C. App. 855, 859, 561 S.E.2d 921, 924 (2002) (citing
Connelly v. Family Inns of Am., Inc., 141 N.C. App. 583, 586-89, 540 S.E.2d 38, 41-42
(2000)). But see Sawyer v. Carter, 71 N.C. App. 556, 561, 322 S.E.2d 813, 817 (1984)
(stating that "evidence pertaining to the foreseeability of criminal attack shall not be
limited to prior criminal acts occurring on the premises").
192. Order Granting Summary Judgment at 1, Wood v. Guilford County, No. 99 CVS
1686 (Guilford County Super Ct. Apr. 5, 2002) (considering the briefs and arguments of all
parties and determining that there were no remaining genuine issues of material fact and
Burns was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
193. Swain v. Preston Falls E., _ N.C. App .... 576 S.E.2d 699, 702 (2003)
(indicating that issues of negligence are "ordinarily questions for the jury and are rarely
appropriate for summary judgment").
194. Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950)
(recognizing the appeals court usually will not hear an interlocutory appeal, but rather will
allow the lower court to determine the entire controversy).
195. Bartlett v. Jacobs, 124 N.C. App. 521, 524, 477 S.E.2d 693, 695 (1996) (citations
omitted); see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277 (1996).
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that an order denying a motion to dismiss grounded on the defense of
the public duty doctrine affects a substantial right and is immediately
appealable.196 The significance of the procedural right to immediate
appeal should not be underestimated. That right, as well as the
likelihood of resolving the case at the pleading stages, render the
public duty doctrine a more efficient way for local governments to
resolve tort cases.
V. THE COMPETING PUBLIC POLICY GOALS AT WORK
At the heart of the debate over the continued viability of the
public duty doctrine lies a set of competing public policy
justifications. In abolishing the public duty doctrine, some state
courts have cited the need to compensate injured plaintiffs, hold
governments financially accountable for wrongdoing and modernize
confusing and antiquated concepts of immunity.'97 On the other
hand, courts seeking justifications for retaining the doctrine have
cited the need to achieve parity between governmental and private
tortfeasors, the differing responsibilities between the public and
private sectors, and the availability of alternate recourse to civil
liability for wrongdoings.'98 Any meaningful justification for the
continued viability of the public duty doctrine in North Carolina will
depend on the courts' willingness to focus on and balance all of the
competing policies.
The need to achieve parity between governmental and private
tortfeasors is the primary policy justification cited for embracing the
doctrine. 199 Courts are reluctant to hold governments liable for
activities that are not required of the private sector. The "rule has
been found to be effective in recognizing and protecting the limited
resources of law enforcement ... [by circumventing] the speculative
effect of a state's unlimited, excessive liability due to the failure to
provide police protection.""2 ° The majority of justices of the Supreme
Court of North Carolina rely heavily on this justification in Hunt and
196. Hedrick v. Rains, 121 N.C. App. 466, 468, 466 S.E.2d 281, 283 (1996), affd, 344
N.C. 729, 477 S.E.2d 171 (1996); Clark v. Red Bird Cab Co., 114 N.C. App. 400, 403, 442
S.E.2d 75, 77 (1994).
197. See Bonnett, supra note 187, at 265 (setting forth the policy rationale).
198. See infra notes 199-208 and accompanying text.
199. See R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Statutes in Derogation of the Common Law: In the
Georgia Supreme Court, 51 MERCER L. REV. 73,77 (1999).
200. Dardis, supra note 134, at 720-21 (citing Parker v. Turner, 122 N.C. App. 381, 383,
469 S.E.2d 569, 571 (1996)); see also Braswell v. Braswell, 330 N.C. 363, 370, 410 S.E.2d
897, 901 (1991) (lamenting the unpredictability of liability exposure resulting from the
imposition of a duty of police protection for specific persons).
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Stone.2° 1 They argue that unlike public agencies, private persons are
required to inspect neither go-karts nor work places and therefore
could not be held liable for the failure to do either.02 Thus, the
justices conclude that in order to leave private and public persons on
equal footing, public agencies must be protected from potential
liability while engaged in- these exclusively public activities.
20 3
According to other public duty doctrine proponents, any other result
would leave public treasuries vulnerable to depletion. °4
Paradoxically, the secondary justification is the inherent
nonparity between the two sectors-namely, government's need to
exercise discretion without the pressures of potential tort liability.
205
Judges have been explicit in their concern that "individuals, juries and
courts are ill-equipped to judge governmental decisions as to how
particular community resources should be or should have been
allocated to protect individual members of the public."20 6 To subject
local officials to inappropriate second-guessing could well
compromise their efficacy, as governmental officials could become
more concerned about liability than carrying out their duties.
A third, albeit less frequently cited, reason to favor the public
duty doctrine is the existence of alternate means to civil liability, such
as elections and referendums, which can be used to hold governments
accountable.0 7 These options for recourse are not available to an
injured party when the wrongdoer is a private person. Examples of
other mechanisms whereby individual officials and their employees
may be held accountable for dereliction of duty include internal
disciplinary proceedings and formal criminal prosecutions. 08 The
practicality of pursuing these mechanisms and their usefulness to an
individual who has been injured by government conduct are
questionable, however.
On the other side of the debate are those who are increasingly
skeptical about treating government tortfeasors differently than
201. See Hunt v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 348 N.C. 192, 199, 499 S.E.2d 747, 751 (1998);
Stone v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 347 N.C. 473, 495 S.E.2d 711, 716 (1998).
202. Hunt, 348 N.C. at 199, 499 S.E.2d at 751; Stone, 347 N.C. at 473, 495 S.E.2d at 716.
203. Hunt, 348 N.C. at 199, 499 S.E.2d at 751; Stone, 347 N.C. at 473, 495 S.E.2d at 716.
204. See, e.g., Ryan v. State, 656 P.2d 597, 598 (Ariz. 1982) (noting the argument by the
State of Arizona that the public duty doctrine serves to protect the treasury).
205. See Bonnett, supra note 187, at 249.
206. Ezell v. Cockrell, 902 S.W.2d 394, 398 (Tenn. 1995) (citing Morgan v. District of
Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306,1311 (D.C. 1983)).
207. See John Cameron McMillan, Jr., Note, Government Liability and the Public Duty
Doctrine, 32 VILL. L. REV. 505,509 n.18 (1987).
208. Id.
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private individuals. These skeptics argue that a "government should
be responsible in damages to any plaintiff injured by one of its
employees acting within the scope of his employment and that
damages should be viewed as simply the cost of administration. 2 9
As the dissent in Hunt points out, the practical effect of allowing a
government "to escape liability for its negligence [is that] ... injured
parties are ... left with no means of recovery. '210 Detractors of the
doctrine note a government entity may be "more suited to bear the
cost [of injury than an individual plaintiff] because the costs can be
allocated to the public through taxatibn.
21 1
In response to the argument that denying governments the
doctrine as a defense to liability would result in limitless liability,
these detractors point out that local governments may act to limit
their liability through the purchase of liability insurance. 2 2  The
argument has some merit. It is probably unreasonable to suggest that
governments will either cease to provide services or become
bankrupted due to their unlimited liability for providing core
functions, such as court facilities. North Carolina's local governments
were able to manage adequately their risk of liability exposure prior
to 1988 when the public duty doctrine became an available defense,
and there is no reason to believe they could not do likewise today.213
Additionally, several courts have determined the law
surrounding the public duty doctrine is more complex, confusing and
unpredictable than the law of ordinary negligence.214 In North
Carolina, the supreme court has sought to substantially narrow the
scope of the doctrine for local governments by limiting application to
law enforcement engaged in police protection.215  However,
209. See Bonnett, supra note 187, at 265.
210. Hunt v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 348 N.C. 192, 200, 499 S.E.2d 747, 751-52 (1998)
(Orr, J., dissenting) (citing Stone v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 347 N.C. 473, 495 S.E.2d 711
(1998)).
211. See Bonnett, supra note 187, at 265.
212. Brennen v. City of Eugene, 591 P.2d 719, 723 (Or. 1979).
213. The author is unaware of any North Carolina local government to be bankrupted
by a civil judgment. See also Note, Government Tort Liability, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2009,
2024 ("[A]s an empirical matter, it is not clear that government liability does in fact lead to
increased damages.").
214. See Beaudrie v. Henderson, 631 N.W.2d 308, 315 (Mich. 2001). (Cavanaugh, J.,
concurring); see also Doucette v. Town of Bristol, 635 A.2d 1387, 1390 (N.H. 1993) (noting
the doctrine is speculative and the cause of "legal confusion, tortured analyses and
inequitable results").
215. See Lovelace v. City of Shelby, 351 N.C. 458, 461, 526 S.E.2d 652, 654 (2000)
(limiting the application of the public duty doctrine). But see Wood v. Guilford County,
355 N.C. 161, 168, 558 S.E.2d 490, 496 (2002) (rejecting "an overly literal reading of the
limitations ... placed on the public duty doctrine as applied to local governments in
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considerable confusion continues to -plague the doctrine. A good
example of the convolution inherent in the doctrine is the fact that
local governments are entitled to a lesser protection under the public
duty doctrine than the State. The supreme court has yet to explain
explicitly why this is so. One wonders whether it is at all possible for
the court to construct an intellectually defensible basis for limiting the
doctrine to law enforcement for local governments but applying it to
safety inspections for the State. 216  The court's apparent policy
rationale for the differing application of the doctrine is certainly not
defensible. In Thompson, the court denies a local government
protection under the public duty doctrine for negligence in inspecting
buildings under the state Building Code.217 Under the present scheme
in North Carolina, local governments are required to carry out
building inspection functions on behalf of the State. Stone and Hunt
make clear that when the State engages in these types of functions
directly, it is entitled to protection under the public duty doctrine.1 8
However, when it delegates the duty to a local government, the
doctrine does not apply. This distinction is untenable, especially in
light of Wood. There, the fact that the local government had
delegated to a private security company its duty to provide police
protection was held to be immaterial to the doctrine's applicability.
Indeed, the court proclaimed that it was "the nature of the duty
assumed" that determined the doctrine's applicability.219 Perhaps the
inability to reconcile such doctrinal inconsistencies and the generally
confusing state of the law surrounding the public duty doctrine may
one day tempt the supreme court to adjust the doctrine.220 However,
Lovelace, and an overly narrow interpretation of the doctrine itself as articulated in
Braswell").
216. No other jurisdiction appears to have embraced the distinction. The only case
found that considered different standards was Doucette v. Town of Bristol, which indicated
the public duty doctrine was introduced but never applied in New Hampshire state law.
635 A.2d 1387, 1390 (N.H. 1993). Doucette suggests municipalities, in contrast to the state
and private citizens, are to be given more protection under the public duty rule. See id.
This observation is in direct contrast to North Carolina law, which allows the state more
protection than local governments under the public duty doctrine.
217. Thompson v. Waters, 351 N.C. 462, 465,526 S.E.2d 650, 652 (2000).
218. See Hunt v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 348 N.C. 192, 194, 499 S.E.2d 747, 748 (1998)
(applying doctrine to a claim against the State for negligence in inspection of an
amusement park ride); Stone v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 347 N.C. 473, 481, 495 S.E.2d 711,
716 (1998) (applying the doctrine to a claim against the State for failure to inspect
workplace).
219. Wood v. Guilford County, 355 N.C. 161,168, 558 S.E.2d 490, 496 (2002).
220. In Nelson v. Freeland, for example, the court examined the advantages and
disadvantages of abolishing the trichotomy of differing standards of liability based on
whether an injured person was an invitee, licensee or trespasser and concluded that
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given the doctrine's significant, albeit diminished, benefits to local
governments,221 confusion, by itself, is not compelling enough to
warrant abolishing the doctrine.
A final argument for abolishing the public duty doctrine as a
defense for North Carolina's local governments proffers that "the
drastic social and economic changes that have taken place since the
public duty doctrine's birth in the nineteenth century warrant that it
follow the doctrine of sovereign immunity into the 'dustheap of
history.' "222 Ironically, it is this very argument that provides the
strongest reason for retaining the doctrine as a defense for local
governments. No court in North Carolina has suggested that the
doctrine no longer reflects the state's mores-an indication allegedly
present in the states that have rejected the doctrine.223  Absent a
abolition of the differing standards would bring clarity to a confusing area of the law. 349
N.C. 615, 631-32, 507 S.E.2d 882, 892 (1998). The court noted three disadvantages to
abolishing the traditional common law: first, possible jury abuse of the reasonable care
standards; second, the unfair burden on landowners who would be forced to maintain
expensive insurance policies; and third, creating an unpredictable legal system. Id. at 624-
25, 507 S.E.2d at 888. These arguments mirror concerns raised in favor of retaining the
public duty doctrine, including juror competence to judge governmental decisions; the
unreasonable cost to governments of increased liability exposure; and the need to
maintain predictability regarding public versus private liability. See infra notes 198-208
and accompanying text. The Nelson court rejected all three arguments against
modernizing the law of premises liability. Nelson, 349 N.C. at 624-25, 507 S.E.2d at 888.
The court pointed out that juries have applied the reasonable care standard for years in
other negligence areas. Id. Courts have repeated that landowners are not "absolute
insurer[s] against all injuries" sustained on their premises. Id. The common law rules are
less predictable and stable than the standard of reasonableness required in ordinary
negligence cases. Id. at 631, 507 S.E.2d at 889-90; see also Phillip John Strach, Too Far,
Too Fast? The North Carolina Supreme Court Eliminates the Common Law Distinction
Between Invitees and Licensees in Nelson v. Freeland, 77 N.C. L. REV. 2377, 2382 (1999)
(explaining the development of the new classification scheme in North Carolina). The
Nelson court then set forth the advantages of abolishing the common law scheme. Nelson,
349 N.C. at 625-31, 507 S.E.2d at 888-92. The court explained that the trichotomy was
created at a time when "it was desirable to provide free reign to a landowner to use and
exploit his land." Id. at 626, 507 S.E.2d at 889. The court noted this thinking was
"outdated" and did not reflect modern society's " 'mores and humanitarian values.' " Id.
at 629, 507 S.E.2d at 890 (quoting Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968)).
The court acknowledged the "complex, confusing, and unpredictable state of law" created
by the doctrine and its many exceptions and sub classifications. Id. at 627, 507 S.E.2d at
889. Finally, the court pointed to the "unfair and unjust results" caused by the common
law system's tendency to deflect attention away from the "issue of whether the landowner
acted reasonably under the circumstances." Id. at 631, 507 S.E.2d at 890.
221. See supra Part IV.
222. Shelly K. Speer, The Public Duty Doctrine and Municipal Liability for Negligent
Administration of Zoning Codes, 20 SEATLE U. L. REV. 803, 803 (1997) (citing John
Cameron McMillan, Jr., Note, Government Liability and the Public Duty Doctrine, 32
VILL. L. REV. 505,529 (1987).
223. See Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 244 (Alaska 1976); Ryan v. State, 656 P.2d 616,
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finding that the public policy of the state no longer embraces
immunity for local governments, North Carolina's courts should not
bring an end to the public duty doctrine.
The significant benefits of the public duty doctrine outweigh the
negative results of its application. In balancing all of the competing
policy rationales, however, courts that have recently considered and
yet retained the public duty doctrine correctly concede that the
strength of the policies weighing in favor of abolition require that the
doctrine be applied sparingly.224 This limitation usually placed on the
doctrine is the one North Carolina imposed in Lovelace and
Thompson: application only in police protection cases.225  The
limitation recognizes that while "a defendant's status ... alone ...
[should] not preclude liability," in most circumstances, " '[p]olice
officers must work in unusual circumstances. They deserve unusual
protection.' "226. Given the origin of the doctrine nationally and in
North Carolina, the limitation appears to be reasonable and
meaningful. 227 The North Carolina courts, however, must develop a
lucid and legitimate framework around this limitation, if it is to
represent a respectable balancing of the public policy concerns that
favor governmental liability with those that favor immunity.
CONCLUSION
In Wood, the Supreme Court of North Carolina failed to address
any of the important lingering doctrinal issues surrounding the public
617-18 (Ariz. 1982); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010,
1022-23 (Fla. 1979); Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664, 671 (Iowa 1979); Schear v. Bd. of
County Comm'rs, 687 P.2d 728, 733 (N.M. 1984); Brennen v. City of Eugene, 591 P.2d 719,
724 (Or. 1979); Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 247 N.W.2d 132, 138-39 (Wis. 1976). See,
e.g., Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 158 (Colo. 1986) (finding the public duty doctrine
inconsistent with the legislative intent behind sovereign immunity waiver).
224. See, e.g., Beaudrie v. Henderson, 631 N.W.2d 308, 319 (Mich. 2001) (Cavanaugh,
J., concurring) (limiting the doctrine's applicability); Hamilton v. Cannon, 482 S.E.2d 370,
372 (Ga. 1997) (limiting the public duty doctrine's application to the police protection
context).
225. See Lovelace v. City of Shelby, 351 N.C. 458, 461, 526 S.E.2d 652, 654 (2000);
Thompson v. Waters, 351 N.C. 462, 465, 526 S.E.2d 650, 652 (2000).
226. Beaudrie, 631 N.W.2d at 316 (quoting White v. Beasley, 552 N.W.2d 1 (Mich.
1996)).
227. Wood suggests that it may turn out to be a difficult limitation to apply in practice.
See Wood v. Guilford County, 355 N.C. 161, 168-69, 558 S.E.2d 490, 496 (2002)
(expanding the limitation to include undefined activities analogous to police protections);
see also Rowe v. Coffey, 515 S.E.2d 375, 381 (Ga. 1999) (Hunstein, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority for effectively eviscerating the police protection limitation by
expanding it to include a sheriff's deputy's decision against the necessity of a road
barricade during a torrential rainstorm).
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duty doctrine or to reconcile the different holdings of Braswell,
Lovelace and Thompson in comparison to Stone and Hunt. Instead,
the court sought blindly to cling to the doctrine. The result further
obscured what was already a complex area of the law and raised
questions about the viability of the doctrine. The court missed an
opportunity to contribute badly needed principle to the law of public
liability and justify the correct, albeit insubstantial, holding of the
case.
